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Visitors to the US National World War II Museum in New Orleans bask in a pro-
foundly reverent psalm to the country’s contribution to the toppling of  fascism.
The exhibits are designed, notes the official website, to convey “the epic and global
scale of  the war that changed the world” (emphasis in original).1 Viewers could be for-
given for leaving with the impression that those epic changes were effected primarily
by the Americans themselves, who, although they countenanced a handful of  for-
eign allies, seemed to tally all of  the key goals unassisted. Beyond All Boundaries, the
4-D movie narrated by Tom Hanks, delivers the war’s origins, battles, and outcomes
in the conventions and motifs of  a Hollywood blockbuster. Patrons, young and old,
swoon over the gleaming machines of  war in the US Freedom Pavilion sponsored
by Boeing, a firm that, despite its standing as the world’s second largest weapons
manufacturer, did not see fit to recuse itself  from such a naked conflict of  interest.2
The greatest generation aura fades, however, when the exhibits turn to is-
sues of  race. More than thirty panels in the permanent collection reference the
racism that pervaded every facet of  American society, from the segregated military
to discrimination in wartime industries, from the internment of  racial minorities to
the profound chauvinism with which white Americans regarded and treated their
darker-skinned foreign foes. Photos of  black soldiers returning to facilities with
segregated entrances and wartime posters depicting the Japanese as repugnant ver-
min abound; even the panel describing the 2.5-ton CCKW Hard Top transport
truck displayed in the Freedom Pavilion informs visitors that many of  the drivers
“were African American, reflecting a segregated military in which blacks were often
relegated to non-combat but essential roles.” In this case, an inanimate tool of  war,
one that formed the backbone of  the supply lines established to sustain the Allied
rollback of  the Nazi empire, carries the permanent mark of  the nation’s racism and
hypocrisy.  
Canada’s National War Museum reveals the vast gulf  that exists between
these neighbouring countries when it comes to discussions of  race. Visitors to the
Ottawa institution are told that Canadians of  all backgrounds clamoured to enlist
in the nation’s foreign conflicts, that Great War volunteers from First Nations were
“accepted because of  their warrior reputation,” and that many Aboriginals, like dec-
orated Ojibwa soldier Frances Pegahmagabow, excelled in their roles. Discussions
of  who recruiters turned away focus on restrictions related to age and physical ca-
pabilities. One panel imagines the modern visitor to be a potential enlistee, and asks
whether their teeth are good enough “to chew the sometimes rock-hard military
food?” A single panel alludes to the fact that Japanese Canadians hoping to join the
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battle against fascism faced unspecified “official barriers,” while another board men-
tions the fact that following the Second World War “Aboriginal veterans had diffi-
culty getting some benefits.” The museum allows that the internment of  “enemy
aliens” in the world wars was the product of  “deep prejudice,” but as rendered here,
that prejudice exerted only a trifling influence over the make-up of  the Canadian
military and its conduct abroad. As a corollary, the bugle call had the power to over-
whelm domestic divisions among Canadians of  various identities, and the country
marched with new-found concord to confront its foe.
What follows are some second thoughts on the comprehensiveness of
that portrait, and on the wider tendencies among Canadian war chroniclers to gloss
over the contradictions between their stated wartime ideals and the lived experiences
of  the nation’s racialized communities. On this matter, the American record is far
more comprehensive and soul-searching, despite the fact that visible minorities on
both sides of  the international divide faced strikingly analogous de jure and de facto
proscriptions, circumstances that the crisis of  warfare had a way of  bringing into
painful outline. 
While race may be, as Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal famously in-
toned, “an American dilemma,” that nation’s ongoing and often graphic struggle
to realize its egalitarian credo has a habit of  obscuring a basic truth: from one angle,
Canada has always contained a greater percentage of  residents who fell outside the
dominant ethno-cultural ideal.3 In addition to its comparatively larger percentage
of  Indigenous peoples, Canada features a Francophone community that, throughout
the twentieth century, comprised nearly one-third of  the Canadian populace. Cana-
dians frequently referred to the two solitudes as distinct races well into that century,
believing English and French to embody profoundly divergent and immutable char-
acteristics.4 Moreover, Francophones’ Catholicism and anti-imperialism, along with
systematic discrimination based on their ethnicity, meant that French Canadians
were destined to serve as a persistent source of  opposition to fighting for a liberal
order that distributed its blessings unevenly.5 Unlike many dissenters in the US, how-
ever, linguistic differences placed at least some limits on the ability of  francophones
to influence the cultural atmosphere of  English Canada. And while their grievances
were well-founded, Francophones were not asked to sacrifice on behalf  of  a country
that denied them the right to vote, restricted their movements, and conducted or
condoned systematic physical violence against them. Such circumstances did indeed
affect many Canadians and Americans, but these were residents set apart by the
particularly obstinate divide of  skin colour. Lacking the status of  visible minority
and the harsher proscriptions that went along with it, the basis of  francophones’
complaints were likewise less visible to many Anglo Canadian observers, who had
the habit of  ascribing this lack of  military enthusiasm to a mishmash of  ignorance,
naiveté, parochialism, and anti-modernism.6
To the extent that these English writers were able to convince their audi-
ence that francophones’ antiwar position was founded primarily on irrational and
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adolescent sensibilities, they also helped to preserve the affirming image of  a nation
that fought as an uncomplicated champion of  liberal values – along with the disaf-
firming and paradoxical image of  Quebec as the betrayer of  those same values.
Donald Creighton’s monograph summarizing the first one hundred years of  the
Canadian experiment made this abundantly clear. “French Canadians,” he explained,
“were colonials and isolationists who saw no reason why Canada should try to play
a major part in world affairs…Their dominating purpose was the defence of  their
own provincial culture, not the establishment of  world peace and security.”7 Such
reductionist conclusions about the source and nature of  francophone sentiments
not only purges English Canadian chauvinism from the historical record; it also
fails to account for the fact that, when placed in a larger North American context,
French Canadians’ disinclination to become embroiled in the vagaries of  European
power politics was hardly unusual.
If  the economic and political marginalization faced by Francophones was
often underappreciated by English Canadians, the inability among whites as a whole
to detect the more systematic exclusions faced by visible minorities would require
considerably more effort. In both Canada and the United States, that effort would
entail an ability not to see the “whites only” signs affixed to the doors of  businesses
until the mid-twentieth century, to not be aware of  the neighbourhood covenants
that prohibited a range of  groups from certain districts of  the community on ac-
count of  their skin colour, to not be alarmed by the presence of  people of  colour
at polling stations before certain points of  time (e.g., Native Americans prior to
1924, Asians in both countries before the late 1940s, Canadian First Nations before
1960, blacks in the American South prior to 1965). Given the especially grave con-
tradictions between wars for freedom and their own rank in the social order, it
should not come as a surprise that racialized citizens would provide some of  the
more venomous and irrefutable denunciations of  each nation’s martial contributions
to the salvation of  foreign peoples. Here the words of  Edward Cooper, editor of
the Colored American, come to mind. Upon hearing President William McKinley’s
call for the “benevolent assimilation” of  the Filipinos seized in the War of  1898,
Cooper wrote, “our white friends have a habit of  expending their sympathy upon
the black man who is farthest off.”8
While people of  colour faced similar restrictions in both nations, the dis-
parity in the presence of  racial minorities as defined (and delimited) by the colour
of  their skin is significant. Throughout the twentieth century, blacks made up be-
tween ten and twelve per cent of  the US population.9 In fact, the number of  Amer-
ican blacks alone eclipsed the total population of  Canada in every twentieth-century
census, growing from nearly nine million in 1900 to nearly thirty million in 1990.10
By the beginning of  the twenty-first century, blacks were surpassed as America’s
largest minority by Hispanics, a group that had grown rapidly since the Second
World War, while the percentage of  Americans who did not identify themselves as
white rose steadily from just over twelve per cent in 1900 to nearly thirty per cent
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by the end of  the century.11
Their Canadian counterparts, on the other hand, made up just 3.5 per cent
of  the population according to the 1901 census, a figure bolstered by the relatively
high numbers of  Indigenous peoples residing in the recently acquired, and suppos-
edly not yet developed, Canadian north and west. As a result, the percentage of
racial minorities reported in 1901 represented the high-water mark of  diversity in
Canada until the 1971 census, after the liberalized immigration policies of  the 1960s
led to an influx of  newcomers from non-traditional sources and an increase in the
total percentage of  those of  non-European origin to 4.4.12 By 2001, as a result of
the continuation of  these trends and a census questionnaire that allowed individuals
to cite more than one ethnicity, the proportion of  those who declared at least a por-
tion of  non-European parentage had risen to roughly seventeen per cent.13
While people of  colour on both sides of  the border faced marginalization
that generated adversarial attitudes toward mainstream society, the wide national
disparity in overall percentages for much of  the twentieth century matters. In the
United States, black voters provided a vital pillar of  the Democratic Party coalition
from the New Deal onward, and the importance of  their labour to industry and
agriculture could at times shape executive policy to profound degrees. The millions
of  American blacks, Hispanics, and Asians provided a critical mass that could sup-
port a wide variety of  newspapers and journals, radio stations, voluntary organiza-
tions, political lobbies, advocacy groups, and in the case of  blacks, their own colleges
and universities. The National Association for the Advancement of  Colored People
(NAACP) counted 90 000 (predominantly black) members and 300 local branches
in 1919, a membership figure nearly equivalent to the total number of  Canada’s In-
digenous peoples, that nation’s largest ethnic minority group (though a group com-
prised of  a range of  disparate cultural and linguistic communities); by the end of
the Second World War, the NAACP boasted nearly half  a million members.14 In
the early 1920s, at least one million Americans joined Marcus Garvey’s Universal
Negro Improvement Association, an organization that, unlike the elite-led NAACP,
was a mass-based international movement open only to blacks.15 Historian Robin
Winks outlined some of  the disparities in publishing: in 1915, J.R.B. Whitney of
Toronto established the weekly Canadian Observer, hoping to establish it as the official
voice of  black Canadians. By 1921, the Observer was gone, leaving no serials printed
for African Canadians at a time when there were 492 such publications produced
by and for African Americans. The ethnic publications that flourished in Canada
over the course of  the twentieth century tended to be those that served linguistic
minorities in their native tongue – rendering their views less accessible to most
Canadians of  the day, and not incidentally, to future historians conducting their
work in English.16 Racialized Americans possessed, in other words, a greater capacity
to make their voices heard. 
But there is more to the relative visibility of  aggrieved groups than mere
numbers: the conspicuousness of  the adversity they face certainly contributes to
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the intensity of  their resistance, and it can be argued that one finds more abundant,
and prominent, expressions of  acute racism in the American narrative than the
Canadian. This is partly a function of  scale: on the one hand, more frequent en-
counters with racialized individuals provide more opportunities for expressions of
racism; on the other hand, higher percentages of  minorities provide a greater level
of  perceived threat to those that seek to maintain hierarchies that work in their
favour. It should not be surprising, then, that some of  the more flagrant episodes
of  racial animus in modern Canadian history were set in British Columbia, with a
significant percentage of  residents of  Asian descent, and in Nova Scotia, home to
large numbers of  African Canadians (some of  whom took to referring to their
province as “the Mississippi of  the North” as a result).17 For the most part, as Winks
wrote in an observation that could be applied to Canadian racial minorities as a
whole, Canada’s black community was not “sufficiently numerous, organized, or
politically oriented to make up a voting bloc, gain power, or to attract hatred because
of  their political potential.”18
Canadian blacks and other minorities certainly attracted hatred, discrimi-
nation, and violence, but, as Winks’ quote implied, anxieties over their ability to
gain influence in the public sphere never approached levels witnessed in the United
States. Persistent fears over the potential power of  American blacks, in particular,
provoked a consistent and fierce backlash. Lynching, an act of  white terrorism
aimed in large part at policing racial boundaries in the American South, claimed ap-
proximately 5,000 (mostly black male) victims in the century following the Civil
War, and just one in Canada over that same span.19 (The lone Canadian lynching
victim, meanwhile, an Aboriginal youth named Louie Sam, was murdered by an
American mob that crossed the Washington-British Columbia border to avenge a
murder that Sam, as it was later revealed, did not commit.)20
Significant episodes of  racial violence did erupt in Canadian communities
– for instance, in 1784 in Shelbourne and Birchtown, Nova Scotia, over labour com-
petition between blacks and whites; in Vancouver in 1887 and again in 1907 over
the rising numbers of  Asians; in Depression-era Toronto by nativist groups against
Jews; in Halifax in 1919 when returning Canadian troops and local whites destroyed
Chinese restaurants, and in that same city in 1991 after several black men were de-
nied access to a nightclub.21 The American record of  race riots is considerably more
extensive; such incidents have been chronicled, by way of  comparison, in a two-
volume, 930-page, 300-entry Encyclopedia of  American Race Riots.22 The world wars
proved particularly conducive to creating the conditions for racial violence, as mil-
lions of  blacks relocated to urban centres to work in war industries; others served
overseas and returned home expecting compensation for their sacrifice in the form
of  the same freedoms they had helped deliver to Europeans. Whites wedded to the
status quo in the workplace, neighbourhood, and the broader social hierarchy were
instrumental in fomenting more than twenty-five riots in the bloody Red Summer
of  1919 alone; a similar wave of  major racial violence swept the nation in 1943.23
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If  numerical strength, subjugation, and resistance exist in a triangular relationship,
the greater visibility of  activism and militancy among American minorities finds
additional explanation in these conditions. 
Canada’s proximity to, and preoccupation with, the United States has also
worked to amplify perceptions of  national differences regarding race. The United
States, the thinking goes, is the nation confounded by a race problem; an ideology
of  racelessness thus emerges as one means of  establishing Canada’s status as un-
or anti-American.24 In the nineteenth century, as the American battle over slavery
propelled the nation toward civil war, a powerful myth emerged that the institution
had never existed in Canada (approximately 3,000 people of  African descent toiled
as slaves in what would become Canada before 1834); through much of  the twen-
tieth century, historical studies of  the African-Canadian experience portrayed
Canada as a straightforward haven of  refuge offering social and legal equality to
blacks fleeing American repression – assumptions that dissolved under the weight
of  later scholarly analysis, but still retain power in contemporary discourse. Canada’s
interactions with its First Nations peoples have also been held up as evidence of  a
more tolerant society – although scholars continue to debate the merits of  those
claims. Regardless, these dynamics have given struggles over racial matters a lower
profile in the recounting of  the Canadian story.25
The visibility of  America’s race problem has also been enhanced by the
attention paid to all things American by supporters and detractors alike the world
over. The international influence of  US culture, politics, and finance rendered the
American story an international concern, and the ability of  American liberalism to
remedy racial inequities provided something of  a litmus test for US claims of  global
leadership, particularly among people of  colour within and beyond US borders. Ac-
cordingly, by the mid-twentieth century, the State Department’s file included an in-
ternational cultural exchange program aimed, in large measure, at reversing negative
perceptions of  American racial politics among foreign governments and peoples.
Racial activists, understanding the power they wielded under such global scrutiny,
simply redoubled efforts to publicize their predicament in hopes of  compelling
concrete measures, rather than mere public-relations campaigns, from Washington.26
Prominent black newspapers and journals circulated widely within and beyond the
nation’s borders, broadcasting the gains and limits of  the American freedom struggle
to a worldwide audience.27
For a host of  reasons, African Americans were frequently in the fore-
ground of  public discourses of  war and peace. As a significant demographic force
with a long history of  anti-slavery and anti-racist agitation, the community devel-
oped strong, interconnected, and highly politicized institutions and organizations.
Moreover, as a people that, until the mid-twentieth century, existed in a polity that
countenanced voting restrictions, discrimination in housing, and Jim Crow segre-
gation, and that ignored consistent and often coordinated acts of  terror against the
black community, African Americans could readily sympathize with colonized peo-
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ples beyond their borders who faced similar affronts, some of  whom were their
ethnic kin. In fact, since the beginning of  the twentieth century, African American
spokespersons have articulated a vision of  their community as a nation-within-a-
nation, an internally-colonized people who linked their experiences with colonized
and racialized peoples abroad.28 Not coincidentally, American conflicts that bore
the appearance of  supporting an imperial agenda – on the part of  America or its
allies – faced sometimes-withering and highly publicized critiques from American
blacks. While many African Americans joined the Anti-Imperialist League during
the War of  1898, a group of  Illinois blacks who wished to make the links between
foreign and domestic tyranny considerably more explicit formed the National Negro
Anti-Expansion, Anti-Imperialist, Anti-Trust, Anti-Lynching League (or NNAEA-
IATALL for “short”).29 In 1907, leading black intellectual W.E.B. Du Bois, a staunch
supporter of  the Anti-Imperialist League, wrote to its president Moorfield Storey
asking for a copy of  a photograph published in one of  the organization’s pamphlets.
Du Bois hoped that the image, “After the Battle of  Bud Dajo” – which depicted
US marines posing triumphantly over a pile of  mangled corpses following the butch-
ery of  roughly 1,000 Filipino Muslim men, women, and children – could be en-
larged, framed, and distributed throughout the United States in order to impress
upon Americans “what wars and especially what Wars of  Conquest really mean.”30
During the First World War, US officials fretted continuously about the
wartime loyalty of  the black community, whose leaders routinely castigated the im-
perial character of  the European regimes and the war itself.31 Desperately needing
their labour and compliance with the draft, and witnessing rising violence between
black and white civilians and soldiers, inveterate racist Woodrow Wilson was moved
to appoint conservative black leader Emmett Scott as special assistant to the Sec-
retary of  War; Scott’s mandate was to win blacks over to the cause.32 Working in
coordination with the Committee on Public Information, Scott strove to convince
African Americans that this was not a white man’s war or a battle for empire, but
“a war of  all the people under the Stars and Stripes for the preservation of  human
liberty throughout the world.”33
American officials were mostly underwhelmed by the results. In June 1918,
the Wilson administration instructed Scott to moderate a secret and what would
prove to be contentious meeting between administration officials and black news-
paper editors and leaders, who were urged to tone down their persistent criticisms
of  the war effort. While many complied, federal agents continued to expend con-
siderable resources monitoring and suppressing outspoken journals like The Crisis,
the official organ of  the NAACP edited by Du Bois, and The Messenger, a black so-
cialist newspaper edited by A. Philip Randolph and Chandler Owen that called on
African Americans to resist the draft. Agents infiltrated meetings of  advocacy
groups like the NAACP, along with black unions and army units, and jailed black
leaders like Randolph and Owen who failed to demonstrate satisfactory support
for the conflict.34 Reigning in black volatility was proving an onerous task.
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If  the First World War was, to many black critics, the predictable upshot
of  imperial rivalries run amok, the Second World War seemed a prime opportunity
to abolish the very institution of  colonialism itself. Fascist expansion and pogroms
justified by racial supremacy demonstrated the logical and dreadful outcome of
race-based theories of  rule, and Allied talk of  the importance of  self-government
to international stability and prosperity – ideas fundamental to the Atlantic Charter
and FDR’s Four Freedoms – inspired enthusiastic endorsements of  the war effort
in the black press and from a broad range of  Americans of  colour. NAACP leader
Walter White, sensing momentum on the colonial issue and drawing on the growing
power of  black voters in northern electoral districts, corresponded with Roosevelt
frequently and was able to secure meetings with the president on several occasions
in order to press the matter.35
It soon became clear that the administration did not share the same level
of  enthusiasm for the dismantling of  empires as the NAACP and the black com-
munity as a whole; for Roosevelt, the desire to maintain the goodwill of  European
allies in order to win the war necessarily restrained America’s anti-imperial efforts.
Voices like White’s, however, could not simply be dismissed, and throughout the
war, American officials were forced to play the demanding, zero-sum game of  ap-
peasing their most important international allies and their racialized constituents
over the postwar fate of  colonized peoples.36 NAACP officials would later vent that
the 1944 Dumbarton Oaks Agreement laying the groundwork for the UN demon-
strated a “total lack of  consideration” of  the colonial question and threatened to
withhold support for the proposal as a result. Fearful of  repeating Woodrow Wil-
son’s failure to rally a cross-section of  Americans behind the idea of  international
governance, the US Secretary of  State invited the NAACP to serve as a consultant
to the US delegation at the United Nations Conference on International Organiza-
tion held in San Francisco in the spring of  1945.37
The imperial trappings of  US wars were not the only source of  African
American war resistance. American blacks had long bristled at the irony of  being
asked to lay down their own lives in order to spread liberty, equality, and democracy
– ideals at the heart of  every public appeal to arms since independence. The truth
all too visible to African Americans was that a nation claiming a divine calling to
extend liberal ideals did so with an army that for decades rejected black conscripts.
Only when the attrition of  the Civil War rendered black recruits indispensable to
the Union cause did the army relent, although African Americans served in segre-
gated units with segregated blood supplies, and generally under white commanders,
long after Hispanics and Native Americans had been accepted into regular combat
units. Blacks were also consigned in disproportionate numbers to non-combat du-
ties, limiting their ability to gain military honours and to thereby confirm their stand-
ing as the physical and intellectual equals of  whites.38 (Du Bois acknowledged the
potential for racial advancement inherent to military service even as he denounced
it, writing: “How extraordinary and what a tribute to religious hypocrisy, is the fact
41A Shared Dilemma
that in the minds of  most people, even those of  liberals, only murder makes
men.”39) And despite President Truman’s 1948 executive order desegregating the
military, blacks continued to fight in separate units for the first year of  the Korean
War, as military officials, backed by southern Democrats who controlled important
congressional committees, simply ignored the new law. Outrage over this intransi-
gence from the black press, the NAACP (which sent lawyer Thurgood Marshall to
Korea to investigate), and liberal Senators led senior officers to begin integrating
units in the summer of  1951, but some all-black regiments were not phased out
until late in 1954.40
These restrictions were merely the military variation of  the denial of  basic
rights experienced in society at large, yielding a range of  responses to war from
black leaders: as the above comments by Du Bois indicate, some argued that demon-
strations of  loyalty and conspicuous contributions to victory would advance the
cause of  racial equality. In a 1917 editorial in The Crisis, Du Bois urged fellow blacks
to “forget our special grievances and close our ranks shoulder to shoulder with our
white citizens” during the First World War.41 Such a strategy went hand-in-hand
with campaigns to give blacks the opportunity to serve in the military on equal
terms with whites, and to thereby prove their patriotism, aptitude, and manhood.
A desegregated and meritocratic army, so the thinking went, would provide a mi-
crocosm for similar transformations in civilian life. While desegregation would have
to wait, protests at black colleges and pressure from a range of  organizations in-
cluding the NAACP led the army to allow blacks to serve in combat units and to
train as officers. By the time of  the armistice, hundreds of  blacks had served as of-
ficers, while Privates Henry Johnson and Needham Roberts, members of  an African
American regiment reassigned to the French, became the first Americans to receive
France’s highest decoration for valour, the Croix de Guerre.42 At least within the mil-
itary, slow progress was being made. 
Similar efforts marked American entry into the Second World War. After
Congress’s declaration of  war, the Pittsburgh Courier, the nation’s most popular black
newspaper with circulation of  350 000 (a figure several thousand higher than the
Toronto Star, Canada’s best-selling newspaper), initiated a nationwide Double-V cam-
paign. The Courier held that black contributions to victory over racist regimes abroad
should be used as leverage to achieve victory over racism and segregation at home.
In their widespread denunciation of  the campaign as untimely and provocative,
white newspapers helped to usher Double-V into the wider public consciousness;
white citizens need not have expressed sympathy with the campaign to recognize
that some Americans found an element of  hypocrisy in their nation’s war for free-
dom.43 For NAACP leaders, the conflict provided the opportunity “to persuade,
embarrass, compel and shame our government and our nation” into concrete action
on racial injustice.44 Recognizing the need to maintain African American support
and subjected to persistent pressure from black leaders, newspapers, and organiza-
tions, the Marines and the Coast Guard admitted blacks for the first time, and blacks
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served as tank operators and pilots – also firsts.45 The exploits of  the so-called
Tuskegee Airmen, an all-black fighter squadron trained at the black university in
Tuskegee, Alabama, consistently made the front pages of  black newspapers and
won them grudging support in the mainstream media.46
Other prominent black voices counselled the withholding of  support for
foreign wars until the freedoms fought for abroad were enshrined at home. “Let us
have a real democracy for the United States and then we can advise a house cleaning
over on the other side of  the water,” wrote the editors of  the Baltimore Afro-American
in 1917.47 Still other African Americans capitalized on the national emergency in-
stigated by war to demand better treatment as a precondition of  support. In 1941,
for instance, black union leader A. Philip Randolph threatened to hold a 100 000-
person march in the nation’s capital to protest racial discrimination in government
agencies and the defence industries. Alarmed by the prospect of  such a public ex-
posé of  the hypocrisy of  the Four Freedoms in his own nation and unable to placate
Randolph with vague promises, FDR issued an executive order that banned dis-
crimination in these sectors and established the Fair Employment Practices Com-
mittee to ensure compliance. “For the first time,” wrote historian John Jeffries,
“FDR had taken major public action on behalf  of  civil rights; indeed, for the first
time since Reconstruction the federal government had created an agency committed
to action toward equal rights for African Americans.”48
Victories like this were significant but sporadic. As historian James West-
heider observed, despite Du Bois’ hope that black contributions to saving democ-
racy in France would help salvage the American variant, racial conditions
deteriorated categorically in the immediate aftermath of  the First World War.49 Two
decades later, when blacks returned from a war against fascism to an America un-
willing to dismantle segregation, “a certain hope died, a certain respect for white
Americans faded,” wrote black author James Baldwin.50 Their wartime service did,
however, politicize many black veterans who believed their sacrifice should count
for something. Consequently, black veterans of  the Second World War and Korean
War formed a core of  the burgeoning Civil Rights movement of  the 1950s and
1960s.51
The black veterans’ move from military service to grassroots agitation sig-
nalled a wider shift in strategy among black activists. The long-held conviction that
service to the nation could be parlayed into the expansion of  democratic rights and
greater recognition had born little fruit, and talk of  utilizing military service as a
weapon against racism began to fade. In the midst of  an unfolding disaster in Viet-
nam, and in the context of  a draft system that provided exemptions weighted toward
privileged Americans, Martin Luther King, Jr. made the continued chasm between
US ideals and the lived experience of  African Americans explicit. “We were,”
charged King in a 1967 sermon at Manhattan’s Riverside Church, “taking the young
black men who had been crippled by our own society and sending them 8,000 miles
away to guarantee liberties in Southeast Asia which they had not found in Southwest
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Georgia and East Harlem. So we have been repeatedly faced with the cruel irony
of  watching Negro and white boys on TV screens as they kill and die together for
a nation that has been unable to seat them together in the same schools.”52 King’s
speech made headlines; it was, observed historian Joe Allen a “bombshell” that in-
furiated the Johnson administration and led to venomous denunciations in the main-
stream press. The Washington Post proclaimed that King had “diminished his
usefulness to his cause, to his country, and to his people.” Time has been kinder to
the assessment of  King’s sermon, as it is now regarded, wrote Allen, as “one of
the best antiwar speeches in American history.”53
Adding to the African American disenchantment with the military was the
fact that armed forces integration took place in an era when the United States be-
came increasingly committed to the defence and extension of  pro-Western regimes
in postcolonial settings. As the percentage of  racial minorities in the US armed
forces multiplied – through conscription to support wars in Korea and Vietnam,
and more generally as a result of  woeful employment prospects for minorities in
the regular workforce – more and more Americans denied freedom by the United
States were required to turn their guns on foreign peoples sharing a similar com-
plexion and predicament. Black writer Clyde Taylor summarized African American
thinking on Vietnam: “One attitude … toward the Vietnamese revolutionaries
among resistant Black people is ‘No Vietnamese ever called me nigger!’ A more
radical reaction is ‘We are all in the same boat.’ The most radical response has been
‘We are allies.’”54 Black activists also considered the financial costs associated with
continual military campaigns particularly unseemly when so many African Ameri-
cans confronted inadequate housing, education, employment opportunities, and
health care. War, in other words, simply intensified black marginality. “By the 1960s,”
wrote historian Kimberely Phillips, “the idea of  combat as a ‘right’ and a declaration
of  black citizenship and the military as ‘equal opportunity’ no longer retained its
rhetorical and organizing power for civil rights struggles.”55 By decade’s end, civil
rights organizations had become de facto antiwar organizations, and calls for racial
justice were joined by equally strident appeals for peace.56 The African American
community, always wary about the use of  force abroad, had been transformed into
a pillar of  American war opposition. Enlisted blacks became key figures in an anti-
war movement emerging from within the military itself, and like their white coun-
terparts, some African American deserters and draft resisters travelled north to seek
refuge in Canada.57
Black antiwar exiles were tapping into a long tradition. Since the American
Revolution, waves of  African Americans quit their country for Canada, and found
a land generally free of  the more extreme acts of  white terrorism that their own
nation was unwilling to confront. They did not, however, discover an Eden of  racial
harmony and equality. Some black Loyalists, anticipating an improved racial climate
under the leavening influence of  the Crown, found more bigotry in Canada than in
the United States, and according to geographer Joseph Mensah, returned to the re-
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public as a result.58 Nearly 1,200 gave up on North America altogether, relocating
to the British colony of  Sierra Leone in 1791.59 Upper Canada’s Abolition Act of
1793 guaranteed fugitive American slaves freedom and the prohibition of  slavery
by the British Parliament in 1834 removed whatever fears remained that blacks
might be returned to a condition of  servitude; still, de jure and de facto discrimination
obviated any claims to racelessness that Canadians harboured over the course of
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. A hodgepodge of  federal, provincial, and
local laws and practices (many adopted directly from the United States) sought to
prevent or discourage non-white immigration, citizenship, integration, business and
labour competition, and social mobility. In the nineteenth century, Ontario banned
African Canadians from running for office or serving on juries, and individual coun-
ties prohibited blacks from buying land or obtaining a business license.60 Segregation
in public transportation, public spaces, and housing was commonplace throughout
the country until the mid-twentieth century, and people of  colour encountered signs
barring them from the entrances to hotels, restaurants, beaches, pools, public parks,
and skating rinks.61 The city of  Edmonton eliminated the need for signage alto-
gether, passing a resolution banning all blacks from the city in 1911.62 While blacks
had been granted the franchise in 1834, Canadian residents of  Chinese and South
Asian descent were denied the right to vote until 1947.63
Lacking the kind of  numbers, resources, and organizational infrastructure
enjoyed by their American counterparts, far fewer racialized minorities sought re-
dress through the courts; when they did, the absence of  a bill of  rights hampered
successful legal challenges to race-based statutes and practices.64 Indeed, no laws
explicitly forbidding discrimination existed in Canada until after the Second World
War. While the law did not “impose segregation,” observed legal historian James
Walker, a series of  high court rulings “upheld the right of  Canadian individuals, or-
ganizations, and institutions to discriminate on the grounds of  ‘race.’”65 Thus, some
African-Canadian children in Ontario and Nova Scotia continued to attend segre-
gated, and markedly inferior, public schools well into the 1960s. An 1849 Ontario
statute authorizing segregation in public education was not overturned until 1964,
ten years after the landmark Brown v. Board of  Education ruling in the US.66 Like-
wise, some institutions of  higher learning and professional training programs clung
to a whites-only policy until the 1960s.67 Not surprisingly, this constellation of  reg-
ulations and practices consigned many of  those excluded to the lowest rungs of
the economic order.
Through it all, the original inhabitants of  the land and the nation’s largest
ethnic minority remained the poorest Canadians. Canada’s Indigenous peoples were,
like their American counterparts, internally colonized, forced onto generally unpro-
ductive reserve lands and presented with a set of  alien political, economic, and legal
arrangements by a state whose authority they rejected. In addition to being subjected
to many of  the day-to-day slights and indignities shared by other non-European
peoples residing in Canada, Indigenous groups were forced to hand over their chil-
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dren to a system of  residential schooling designed to rid them of  their language,
religion, and other aspects of  the so-called backwardness that rendered them in-
compatible with the liberal order; exposés of  the systematic abuse suffered by chil-
dren in these settings continue to make headlines. The federal government banned
many traditional cultural practices with the same goal of  assimilation in mind. Re-
serve territory guaranteed by treaty was frequently appropriated at a later date, or
squatted on or seized by whites. The franchise was not extended to Aboriginals
until 1960.68
Many of  the supposed differences between the experiences of  American
and Canadian racial minorities were, therefore, simply imagined.69 Given their stand-
ing in the social order, it is to be expected that racialized Canadians exhibited similar
reactions to those in the United States when their respective federal governments
took their nations into war. Some questioned their obligations to a state and society
unwilling to countenance them as equals. Frequently overlooked in the Quebec-v.-
Rest-of-Canada depictions of  the conscription crises, for instance, is the fact that
thousands of  racialized Canadians organized against the policy in a direct protest
against their disenfranchisement.70 Concerns over whether racial minorities would
serve were one thing; fears that their marginalization might inspire active support
for the enemy were quite another. At the beginning of  the South African War, ru-
mours circulated that certain Aboriginals, still infuriated over the repression of  In-
digenous and Métis peoples during the North-West Resistance, wished to travel to
South Africa and join the Boers in training their guns on British imperial forces.71
In fact, anxieties over arming racial minorities and tutoring them in the art of  mod-
ern warfare proved a persistent concern among Canadian officials contemplating
the makeup of  their nation’s forces; similar apprehensions led to widespread oppo-
sition to black enlistment in the US services prior to the Civil War.72
Other Canadians of  colour chose to support various wars out of  patriot-
ism and the idealistic goals of  fighting for democracy and self-determination. Many
expressed the conviction that military service would provide indisputable evidence
of  the qualities racist discourse insisted they lacked – loyalty, competence, and man-
hood – and trusted that their contribution would spur more favourable treatment
for themselves and their kin. Indigenous peoples also believed participation would
strengthen their desire for permanent inclusion and autonomy (as opposed to their
assimilation) within Canada – sentiments not unlike those expressed by mainstream
Canadians who saw participation in the empire’s battles as a means of  enhancing
their nation’s sovereignty.73 After Laurier dispatched the first contingent of  Canadian
troops to South Africa in the fall of  1899, for example, a number of  First Nations
leaders delivered appeals to local Indian agents and federal officials in Ottawa and
Britain offering military service. “The Indians of  the Saugeen Reserve,” noted one
letter, “are anxious to go to the Transvaal in case another contingent be sent…
They are anxious to show their loyalty.”74 During the First World War, the Grand
Indian Council of  Ontario sent a letter to individual tribes that recognized the in-
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congruities of  sending their young men to fight for “liberty, freedom and other
privileges dear to all nations, for we have none.” Yet the council encouraged enlist-
ment and accepted conscription in order to show other Canadians that Indigenous
peoples shared “the same instincts” and the “same capabilities.”75 That same conflict
inspired a deep desire to serve among some African Canadians, who wished to show
their gratitude for the refuge the nation provided “in the dark days of  American
slavery,” as Hamilton journalist George Morton wrote in a letter to minister of  mili-
tia Sam Hughes.76 J.R.B. Whitney, editor of  the short-lived black weekly Canadian
Observer, saw the conflict as a way to demonstrate to Canadians the fighting prowess
already recognized, he maintained, by the enemy. “Germans Dread Colored Soldiers
in the Battlefield” read one Canadian Observer headline.77 As little had been done to
improve racial conditions in Canada between the wars, the nation’s entry into the
Second World War was accompanied by a similar array of  patriotic and practical
arguments for full citizen participation.78
Like their American counterparts, however, Canadian racial minorities will-
ing to die for their country, liberal ideals, and the advancement of  their race were
forced to contend with a military establishment largely unmoved by the gesture.
Unlike the situation in the US army, however, which established separate, mostly
non-combat regiments for black troops, many Canadian racial minorities attempting
to volunteer for military service were simply turned away. This was essentially an
issue of  prejudice meeting scale, as the percentage of  racialized Canadians was too
low to provide a serious political dilemma for officials over the issue, too low for
commanders to risk challenging the chauvinism of  their white soldiers for the sake
of  a handful of  potential additions, and too low for the government to assume the
considerable cost and effort of  creating a segregated army.79 Accordingly, colonial
secretary Joseph Chamberlain wrote directly to leaders of  the Haudenosaunee (Iro-
quois) Confederacy who had proposed sending troops to South Africa, thanking
them for their loyalty and expressing regret at having to decline “their patriotic
offer.”80 Canada’s Department of  Indian Affairs dutifully followed the British line
and informed local agents that Indigenous peoples would not be permitted to serve
in South Africa. Prospective black and Asian volunteers faced a similar response.81
Except for an outright ban on First Nations’ enlistment, there was no of-
ficial policy regarding racial minorities in the early stages of  the First World War;
the matter was placed in the hands of  individual commanders and recruiters, who
were generally unified in the practice of  accepting only white applicants.82 When
the oft-repeated assurance (from combatants on both sides) that the war would be
“over by Christmas” proved a cruel hoax, Canadian officials prosecuting a total war
came to see the illogic of  rejecting willing applicants for overseas service. By the
end of  1915, army recruiters were ordered to accept all able-bodied men. A handful
of  blacks, Asians, and First Nations peoples made their way into regular units, but
most applicants continued to face rejection from military officials who simply ig-
nored the directive from Ottawa. In a survey by Military Council of  unit command-
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ers, one officer explained that he refused black volunteers because it would be unfair
to expect his “fine class of  recruits” to be forced “to mingle with negroes.”83 An-
other stated that neither he nor his men “would care to sleep alongside them, or to
eat with them, especially in warm weather.”84 The allegedly pervasive fears of  min-
gling could be mitigated, reasoned Canadian Observer editor Whitney, by organizing
an all-black platoon. When Acting Minister of  Militia and Defence A. Edward
Kemp informed parliament that no efforts were underway to organize such a unit,
Whitney, who had been advertising for recruits in his newspaper, wrote to the min-
ister to inform him that he had one ready to go.85 He need not have bothered: a
subsequent survey of  Toronto-area commanding officers found none willing to ac-
cept the group. “At a time when Prime Minister Borden had committed Canada to
the daunting task of  keeping 500,000 men in the battlefields,” wrote James Walker,
“not a single battalion would take a Black platoon.”86 Vancouver-area Japanese Cana-
dians who also raised their own unit were met with the same response.87
At the end of  April, 1916, facing critical manpower shortages and on the
recommendation of  an internal report which reiterated some of  the more demean-
ing stereotypes regarding black capacity, Canada’s military council authorized the
creation of  a single black construction battalion. A year later the black soldiers left
for Liverpool in their own troop ship to avoid “offending the sensibilities of  other
troops” also making the crossing; military officials discussed, and eventually rejected,
sending the segregated vessel across the Atlantic alone and unprotected rather than
in a regular convoy during what was described as “one of  the worst weeks of  un-
restricted submarine warfare.”88
In their attempts to maintain and police imprecise and mutable notions
of  racial hierarchy and classifications of  citizenship, Canada’s military policies re-
garding ethno-cultural groups blended equal parts tragedy and farce. Some of  the
members of  the all-black construction battalion had been pressed into service
through conscription, a law considered applicable to all British subjects.89 In other
words, Canadian minorities who were initially informed they were unwanted in the
forces were now told they must serve. By January 1918, Borden’s government revised
the Military Service Act to exempt First Nations and Japanese on the grounds that
they did not possess full citizenship rights (and that the government had no interest
in extending them). Three months later, another order exempted all British subjects
prohibited from voting at the federal level from military service; three months after
that, East Indians were granted an exemption even though, deprived of  the fran-
chise, they had been covered by the previous order.90 Having long possessed the
right to vote, African Canadians were given no such latitude despite their undeniable
status as second-class citizens. Unsurprisingly, several years of  humiliating rejection,
increasing awareness of  the horrors of  trench warfare, and reports from the handful
of  visible minorities in the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) about the bitter
racism they encountered from fellow soldiers, dissipated much of  the earlier en-
thusiasm for enlistment.91 Officers hitherto panicked by the prospect of  including
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African Canadians in their units now complained to military headquarters that a
number of  blacks had slipped across the border to avoid performing their solemn
duty. One Ontario commanding officer wrote to another, recommending that “to
obtain these men that rightfully belong to us,” the military would need to actively
hunt down uncooperative blacks. It is unlikely that the reason for black draft resist-
ance advanced in that letter – that “the average negro is rather ‘afraid of  the Army’”
– would be moderated by this proposed military roundup of  black civilians.92
Perhaps most incongruously, little moral or administrative enlightenment
was gleaned from the Great War experience of  rejecting certain classifications of
willing applicants in times of  personnel shortages; when Canada joined the Second
World War, many volunteers again found that the pigmentation of  their skin ren-
dered them unwelcome. As with the First World War, Ottawa left the matter of  re-
cruitment up to the discretion of  individual commanders, who once again
responded to a survey on the enlistment of  African Canadians with claims that
white troops would refuse to fight in, or even sign up for, an army that welcomed
blacks.93 The jarring dissonance between these sentiments and the rationale for a
war against fascism did not appear to strike those queried. Moreover, while official
recruiting policy stated that the army welcomed anyone demonstrating suitable levels
of  fitness and education, these variables could serve as stand-ins for race when
commanders wished to discourage undesirable recruits (in addition to the fact that
poverty and segregation correlate strongly with poorer health and lower levels of
education).94 Still, the army constituted the branch most welcoming to Canadians of
colour. Until 1943, the Royal Canadian Air Force simply prohibited the enlistment
of  men who were “not both of  pure European descent and the sons of  natural
born or naturalized subjects”; the navy’s proscription against enlistees not “of  the
white race” remained until after the D-Day invasion of  June 1944.95 And once again,
groups willing to enlist in the army but discouraged or banned on the basis of  skin
colour would be ordered to do so when conscription was reintroduced in 1944. 
The confusion, inconsistency, frequent revision, and most of  all, hypocrisy
of  the Canadian military’s racial policies inspired abundant, vigorous, and com-
pelling counter-arguments from those most affected. During the First World War,
letters from prominent African Canadians objecting to the near-universal rejection
of  black volunteers at a time of  scarce recruits reached Prime Minister Borden and
Minister of  Militia Sam Hughes. When Borden’s government introduced conscrip-
tion, First Nations peoples and Japanese Canadians delivered a wave of  petitions
to Ottawa and London protesting the imposition of  citizenship duties on those
who did not possess citizenship rights.96 Indigenous anti-recruiters hounded official
recruiters sent to reserves, “reminding Indians of  their grievances and the many
government promises made to them which had been broken throughout history.”97
The reprisal of  prejudicial recruiting in the Second World War incensed a
group of  black Halifax veterans, who were left to conclude that their Great War
sacrifice had gone unrecognized and wrote the Minister of  National Defence to
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say as much.98 When First Nations were once again conscripted in 1944, a sympa-
thetic Department of  Indian Affairs agent from British Columbia explained to his
superiors that the low enlistment figures from his region were due to the Navy’s
blanket rejection of  Aboriginal applicants. “It is this discrimination against the B.C.
Indian that has made them oppose being called up and put in the army,” he wrote.99
Other letters, band resolutions, and petitions pointed to First Nations’ exclusion
from schools, hotels, government jobs, and the legislative process as fundamentally
incompatible with their inclusion under the provisions of  the Selective Service
Act.100 The fact that the wars were fought under the banner of  bringing liberty to
others only deepened the sense of  betrayal. Canada’s visible minorities, in other
words, articulated responses to their nation’s wars that were frequently indistinguish-
able from those voiced by their American counterparts. The similarity of  their
plight, along with the links between Canadian and American racialized groups
forged through transnational alliances – and in Canada, via the popularity of  Amer-
ican-based minority newspapers and journals – provoked strikingly similar protes-
tations against government policy and the wars themselves.
Distinct differences existed, however, in the ability of  minority groups to
make their grievances known to the wider public, and by extension, to find a promi-
nent place in the national memory of  the war. As indicated above, in Canada the
preponderance of  objections to exclusionary and prejudicial policies took place out
of  public view: in letters and petitions to politicians, Bureau of  Indian Affairs agents,
and military officers; in correspondence between First Nations bands, and in meet-
ings where military recruiters sparred with draft resisters. Publications by and for
racial minority groups were virtually non-existent, however, and most public infor-
mation on the activities and mood of  racialized Canadians in wartime was set down
in the mainstream media. Never a mainstay of  sensitivity to the particular concerns
of  non-canonical Canadians, wartime patriotism and censorship intensified media
organizations’ emphasis on consensus, unity, and state boosterism. Accordingly,
stories on the responses of  ethnic minorities to war, when they appeared at all, were
heavily invested in establishing that Canadians as a whole demonstrated broad sup-
port for the war effort. Countless daily papers celebrated First Nations’ donations
to Victory Bonds, the residential schoolchildren who made clothing to support the
war effort, and the women, children, and elders who pulled together to keep their
reserves functioning in the absence of  enlisted men.101
In all, wrote Sheffield, positive Indigenous responses to the war effort
were “eagerly reported in the nation’s media.”102 By contrast, the widespread objec-
tions to military service based on the indignities of  being refused service, denied
access to high school, the workforce, and the voting booth, and treated as children
and wards, were generally confined to letters, memoranda, and petitions found in
the files of  the Department of  Indian Affairs and other federal agencies. These
were not the types of  stories likely to be run by a wartime media committed to in-
spiring loyalty and unity, and to proclaiming the merits of  a crusade for liberty con-
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ducted abroad. This, despite Sheffield’s finding that “the marginalized place of  Sta-
tus Indians in the social and legal landscape of  Canada,” rather than treaty rights,
worries over labour shortages on reserves, or any other concerns, served as “the
most prevalent issue raised by First Nations opponents of  conscription.”103
Although the obstacles to full inclusion confronting Canadian and Amer-
ican racialized groups bore striking similarities, and wars fought to extend liberal
ideals placed domestic racial exclusions under a particularly unflattering glare, the
spotlight directed on American action and inaction on these injustices was always
brighter. Visibility, however, did not always, or even often, translate into progress
concerning the American dilemma. Still, the conspicuous clamour over race in
wartime America made the issue an important component of  the story of  war itself.
It is difficult to find a book-length survey of  US involvement in the Second World
War written since the 1960s, for instance, that does not include at least some treat-
ment of  matters like the proposed march on Washington and the resultant deseg-
regation of  war industries, the Double-V campaign, the ironies of  fighting Hitler
with segregated forces, the barriers overcome by the Tuskegee Airmen, the irrec-
oncilable persistence of  Jim Crow in the years following a war against fascism, and
the momentum the Four Freedoms provided to modern civil rights activism.104 In-
deed, in a spate of  volumes produced since the 1980s that took aim at more ro-
mantic and pious representations of  America at war, racial animus in the civilian
and military realms was often the story.105 Innumerable specialized studies of  the
wartime experiences of  Americans of  colour at home and abroad have reinforced
the stature of  racial conflict in all its guises in the representation of  the war.106
Even Tom Brokaw’s best-selling and hagiographic The Greatest Generation
included an entire section, entitled “Shame,” comprised of  five chapters dedicated
to racial minorities’ Second World War experience. “Any celebration of  America’s
strengths and qualities during those years of  courage and sacrifice,” wrote Brokaw
in his introduction to the section, “… will be tempered by the stains of  racism that
were pervasive in practice and in policy. As it was an era of  great glory for America
and its people, it was also, indisputably, a time of  shame.”107 One effect of  this type
of  remembrance, as John Bodnar noted, is that it “resist[s] efforts to sentimentalize
completely what had taken place in the early 1940s.”108 An acknowledgement of
wartime racial struggles, even when soft-pedalled, moderates the more simplistic
and triumphal narratives of  a righteous nation summoned to replace a foreign evil
with a liberal democratic order it had perfected at home. 
That race plays a less prominent role in the recounting of  Canada’s military
history should not come as a surprise. This particular theme has never received the
kind of  attention directed at America’s difficulties over the issue, a consequence of
Canada’s smaller percentage of  visible minorities and its proximity to the more con-
spicuous, headline-grabbing racial traumas of  the United States. In many parts of
the country, however, Canada’s edition of  Jim Crow proved just as comprehensive
and long-lasting as its southern progenitor, and the nation’s general racial attitudes
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and policies consciously echoed the practices deployed to maintain white dominance
in the United States. The impact of  racialized thinking was particularly striking in
the Canadian military, where opportunities for people of  colour tended to lag be-
hind even those of  the rigidly-segregated American forces. Rather than being given
an opportunity to prove themselves and gain social acceptance in their own, separate
units, many Canadians who sought to enlist were simply rebuffed during the South
African War and in the first years of  both world wars. When the opportunity to
serve finally came, either through dogged campaigning for the right or via the co-
ercion of  conscription, the work was generally not the type that would win the
recognition and gratitude people of  colour considered so vital to their broader social
advance. At a time when African American squadrons flew over North Africa and
Sicily, and blacks serving on US naval vessels battled German and Japanese warships
on the high seas, the Canadian branches of  these services clung to a strict, whites-
only policy. Discrimination in war-related industries, meanwhile, was not banned
until November 1942, more than a year after the practice was outlawed in the United
States.109
While the fact that fewer numbers of  Canadians were affected by racial
ordering in civilian and military life helps to explain the lower profile afforded the
issue in that country, it is another thing to suggest that such themes are unimportant
to the larger story of  war. For nations fighting under the banners of  freedom,
democracy, justice, and equality, the systematic denial of  these principles and ideals
at home has a place in the record, regardless of  the numbers involved. As in the
American context, mindfulness of  the bitter racial animus faced by racialized Cana-
dians can moderate some of  the self-congratulation surrounding the deliverance
of  national virtues to a needy world, serving as an indication that a full remembrance
of  war includes an acknowledgment of  societal failings and the pain they brought
to some citizens. At the same time that they were subjected to a wartime deluge of
radiant proclamations about the virtues of  their liberal democracies, visible minori-
ties seeking to contribute to this great cause found that its promises were contingent
on skin colour. Remembering in this way, then, affirms that while Canada may have
important lessons to share with the world, there is also room for humility about the
nation’s own efforts to realize the ideals it claims. 
Greater attention to the matter of  race also serves as a reminder that while
Canada fought wars, as Creighton wrote, to establish “world peace and security,”110
some of  those conflicts also sought to sustain, rather than dismantle, a racially-or-
dered world system - “a world-girdling British imperial federation controlled by His
Majesty’s white subjects,” in Desmond Morton’s apt phrase.111 It was a theme that
Americans of  colour injected into their national conversation early and often, but
one with a far lower profile in the Canadian record. When one learns, moreover,
that white Canadians preparing to take on fascism expressed repugnance at the
thought of  conducting this task alongside blacks, and that many sent to Korea
broadcasted in word and deed their deep contempt for Asians, we need to look to
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motivations for Canadian intervention that go beyond facile affirmations of  the de-
sire to rid the world of  malevolent theories and regimes – to simply, as one volume
on Canada’s Second World War effort concluded, “preserve the basic human right
to be free.”112 That was certainly part of  the story, though not the whole story, and
for some civilians and soldiers alike, not the story at all. 
It has taken some time for a discussion of  the racial animosity in Canada’s
military and wider culture to find its way into the record of  war. Japanese internment
gained greater notice beginning in the mid-1970s, providing a challenge to notions
of  national innocence and righteousness, and studies of  the episode began to raise
the complicated story of  Asian Canadians’ attempts to contribute to the world
wars.113 Around the same time, First Nations and Métis groups grew increasingly
vocal about their omission from the national story of  war and their difficulty in ac-
cessing veterans’ benefits; as a result, historians were alerted to the experience of
Canada’s “forgotten soldiers,” as historian Fred Gaffen called them in the title of
his seminal work on the subject from 1985.114 Little was said of  the role and plight
of  black soldiers in the world wars until American historian Robin Winks gave the
subject some attention in his 1971 monograph on African-Canadian history. Little
more was added until Calvin Ruck’s 1987 study, aptly titled The Black Battalion, 1916–
1920: Canada’s Best Kept Military Secret.115
Still, if  the paradox embedded in America’s racial dilemma and its stated
wartime goals provides a consistent leitmotif  for US analysts, similar analysis is
mostly consigned to specialized studies in Canada, and is absent or lightly handled
in many general Canadian war accounts. A recent and encyclopedic study of  the
three-hundred year history of  Canada’s army, for example, mentioned the predica-
ment of  black soldiers once, admitting that while they initially experienced difficul-
ties enlisting in the First World War on account of  prejudice, “pressures for men
destroyed most such barriers.”116 With no subsequent discussion of  matters like
segregated units or the rejection of  black, Asian, and Indigenous volunteers in later
wars, the reader is left to believe that any racial discrimination in the Canadian army
had been overcome, in that war and for all time. As noted in the discussion of  the
Canadian War Museum that began this paper, the short shrift given to the extensive
and often bitter chronicle of  racial minorities’ struggle for respect and equal op-
portunity in the Canadian military is not atypical. While such an approach does little
to illuminate an unflattering and often overlooked corner of  the nation’s past, it
undoubtedly heartens those who view Canada and its armed forces as straightfor-
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